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Anderson  and Neary address the problem of measuring  the trade restrictiveness  of purely
domestic  policies  such as production  taxes  and subsidies. It is widely  accepted  that such policies
distort trade patterns and attempts have been made to quantify their impact.  However, these
have typically  calculated  producer and consumer  subsidy equivalent  indices, which  are averages
of subsidies  weighted  by the production or consumption  shares of the subsidised commodities.
Such indices  lack any theoretical  foundation  and have obvious  practical limitations:  for example,
highly taxed commodities  are given a low weight whereas intuitively they should be heavily
weighted  in assessing  the overall trade restrictiveness  of the tax and subsidy  structure. Anderson
and Neary propose alternative indices which avoid these difficulties and are firmly based in
welfare economics, yet at the same time can be estimated feasibly with relatively low data
requirements.
The approach  proposed by Anderson  and Neay  builds on recent work of theirs on the
Trade Restrictiveness  Index (TRI), wbich  aggregates  the effects  on trade of a complicated  pattern
of trade distortions such as tariffs and quotas.  Extending the TRI to encompass domestic
distortions has a straightforward intuitive interpretation: the value of  the Index answers the
question "What uniform tariff would have the same effect on welfare and the trade balance as
a given structure  of domestic  consumer  and producer taxes and subsidies?" The Index can also
be applied to a comparison  between two distorted  situations  rather than to a comparison  between
an initial distorted situation and free trade; in that case, it gives the uniform "tariff factor
surcharge," or  change in domestic prices to  both consumers and producers, which would
compensate  for the move from the initial to the new distorted situation.
The authors show that changes in this Index equal a weighted  average of changes  in the
distorted  prices facing  consumers  and producers,  where the weights  are marginal  welfare  weights
reflecting the welfare  costs of distortion  changes. They note that their Index is preferable to the
standard ad hoc producer and subsidy  equivalent  indices on two counts.  Firstly, it uses these
marginal weights rather  than average weights wlch  bear  no  relation  to  the  degree of
restrictiveness  of the distortions.  Secondly, the TRI aggregates correctly over consumer and
producer distortions, something  which cannot  be done using the ad hoc indices.Taxes arid-subsidies  affecting the producers and consumers  of traded  goods are only one
form of domestic  distortioin  which impacts  on trade. Taxes and subsidies  in the markets for non-
traded  goods or forfaetors of production  also distort trade indirectly. Anderson  and Neary show
how the TRI may be extended to incorporate these types of distortions. Once again, the value
of  the TRI gives the equiproportionate  change in  the prices of traded goods which would
compensate  fora given change in all distortions,  both in traded and in non-traded goods and in
'factor markets.
Having developed  the theory of the TRI, Anderson  and Neary proceed to illustrate  how
it may be applied in practice, drawing on a larger study ' y Anderson and Bannister of the
changes  in Mexican.ggricultural  policy between 1985  and 1989. Specialising  the TRI to a partial
-equilibrusiL  context allows existing estimates of  key demand and supply elasticities to  be
incorporated  into the Index; and the basic formula is adapted to take account of some special
features of Mexican agricultural markets.
The results of the empirical study are of considerable  interest.  The TRI shows a large
increase in-restrictiveness in  1986 and especially in  1987 followed by  major reductions in
restrictiveness  in 1988 and 1989.  The cumulative  effect of these changes is a 40.9% fall in
trade restrictiveness  over the four-year  period.  Examination  of the disaggregated  components
of the Index reveal that the major, though not the sole, source of changes  in trade restriniveness
over the period was changes in producer subsidies, especially  to the major crop, maize. These
trends are not captured  by the changes in the consumer  and producer subsidy  equivalen;  mndices,
-which  the authors also present.  Indeed, in a number of years the change in at least one of the
ad hoc indices is in the opposite direction to the change in the corresponding  welfare-based
index.
The -authors  conclude that the TRI provides a theoretically  consistent anc empirically
feasible framework for investigating  the trade implications  of domestic distortions.I  IntroductionC
It is widely  appreciated  that  government  policies  of a purely  domestic  nature  can  have  major
implications  for a country's  international  trade.  To give  just one example,  such  implications
have  been  widely  discussed  in the context  of the current  GAIT round,  in which  US negotiators
have  insisted  that intra-EC  agricultural  policy  should  be viewed  as trade-distorting. However,
analysts  and negotiators  have  not hitherto  had access  to a conceptual  framework  which  would
allow  the trade effects  of domestic  policies  to be measured  in a consistent  way. In this paper,
we propose  such  a framework  and show  how it may  be implemented  empirically.
Of course, other attempts  have  been made  to quantify  the overall  distortionary  effects  of
domestic  policics. These  have  involved  constructing  empirically  based  indexes  such  as producer
or consumer  subsidy  equivalents.  I  However,  such  measures  have  no theoretical  foundation.
Moroeover,  since they use the shares of different  sectors  in production  or consumption  as
weights,  they  are likely  to be systematically  biased:  for  example,  sectors  whose  output  levels  are
reduced  by high taxation  are assigned  low weights  whereas  their "true" weights  should  be
higher.  By contrast,  we show  below  that our approach  is based  firnly on welfare  economics
and correctly  uses  marginal  rather  than average  production  and consumption  shares  as weights.
The approach  we propose  draws  on our recent work (Anderson  and Neary, 1990, 1991)
which dealt with trade distortions  only.  There we developed  a scalar index equal to the
equiproportionate  rate of trade restriction  which is equivalent  (in welfare  terms) to a given
system  of trade policies.  For example,  if trade is restricted  by tariffs  only, then our index
equals  the uniform  tariff which  is welfare-equivalent  to the initial  tariff structure. 2 We have
shown  that our index  has a sound  basis in standard  welfare  economics:  it serves  to synthesise
TMis  paper was written  as part of a World  Bank  project  on "The Cost of Protection  Index'
(RPO  676-49). For helpful  comments,  we are grateful  to Geoff  Bannister  and to participants
in seminars  at the World Bank,  the University  of Konstanz,  and the EEA 92 Conference  in
Dublin.
'See, for example,  OECD  (1991).
2 For an early development  of this approach,  see Corden  (1966).the literature on "distance  function" mreasures  of welfare change 3 with that on the measurement
of the cost of protection. 4 We have also argued that the index may be used in at least two
altemative  ways: either as an oiganising  priiiciple  for reporting  the results of computable  general
equilibrium  m.,dels; or, with appropriate  additional  assumptions,  ais  a technique  for constructing
approximate local measures of changes in policy restrictiveness  in either partial or general
equilibrium  models.'  In either case, the use of our index permits consistent  comparisons  of
the restrictiveness  of trade policy to be made across countries and across time.
All this previous work has considered  only trade distortions, and assumes that the domestic
economy is undistcrted.  In the present paper, we show how this approach  may be extended  to
incorporate purely domestic distortions.  In  effect, we ask what uniform tariff would be
equivalent to a given set of domestic policy instruments.  Measuring the trade impact of
domestic policies in this way has obvious potential as an input into trade negotiations  and as a
summary  of how a country's trade orientation has evolved.  Of course, if the method is to be
useful it is essential that it can be implemented  empirically.  We t'erefore devote considerable
attention to showing that this can indeed be done and to illustrating some of the shortcuts that
are necessary in empirical work.
3 See Debreu (1951), Deaton (1979) and Diewert (1985).
4  Standard references include Foster and Sonnenschein  (1970), Bertrand and Vanek (1971),
Bruno (1972), Lloyd (1974) and Hatta (1977);  the literature  has been surveyed  b)  'orden (1984)
and Dixit (1987); and our index also takes account of recent extensions of the literature to
incorporate the costs of quota as well as tariff protection  by Corden and Falvey (1985), Falvey
(1988), Neary (1988, 1989) and Anderson and Neary (1992a).
I For partial equilibrium applications  see Anderson (1991) and Anderson and Neary (1992b);
work on a general equilibrium  )plication is in progress.
2The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section II draws on Anderson  and Neary (1992b) to
extend the theory of our measure,  the Trade Restrictiveness Index  (TRI),'  to the case where
domestic  taxes  or subsidies  drive a wedge  bc-tween  the prices faced by producers and consumers.
The relationship  between our index and the ad hoc  producer and consumer subsidy equivalent
indices in considered in Section III.  Sections 1V  and V then examine how the Index can be
adapted  to allow for the effects  of other types  of domestic  distortions, in markets for non-traded
goods or factors  of production.  The results of a pilot application  of the Index, which draws on
a larger study of Mexican agriculture by Anderson and Bannister (1992), are presented in
Section VI.  Finally, Section VIII makes some concluding  remarks.
6  In our first presentation of  the  measure, Anderson and Neary (1990), we called it the
"coefficient of  trade  utilisation" reflecting its  parallel  with  the  "coefficient of  resource
utilisation"  of Debreu (1951).  That paper considered  quota restrictions  only whereas  Anderson
and Neary (1992b) extended the measure to incorporate  both tariffs and quotas. In the present
paper we consider only price distortions but it is straightforward, if tedious, to incorporate
quantitative  restrictions  by adapting the methods  of our earlier papers.
3XI The TarAf Equivalents  of Distortions  in 7raded Goods  Markets
In this section, we introduce notation  and assumptions  aa.  develop the theory of the
Trade Restrictiveness  Index (MI)  for the case where the only  forms of policy intervention  are
taxes or subsidies  to domestic  producers or consumers  in traded goods markets.
Throughout  the paper we assume that  the economy  under  conAideration  is small,  trading with
the rest of the world an untaxed numeraire  good and n other E zods whose given price vector is
denoted p"'. 7 Because of domestic policies, this may differ fiom the price vector facing
domestic producers, p,  and from the price vector facing domestic consumers, q.  Thus a
particular traded good indexed  by i may  have a subsidy  to production,  so that pi-pi* is positive,
or a tax, so that pi-pi*  is negative.  Irn  addition, it may have a subsidy  to consumption,  so that
q,-q,*  is-negative,  or a tax, sc *hat  q,-q,* is positive.  If the only form of intervention  is trade
policy, domestic producer and consumer prices are equal; thus, an import tariff (or export
subsidy) is equivalent  to an equiproportionate  producer subsidy  and consumer  tax:  pi =  q%  >
pi*; and an import subsidy (or export tax) is equivalent  to an equiproportionate  producer tax and
consumer subsidy:  pi =  q; <  pi*.  In the analysis which follows, it turns out to be most
convenient to treat the producer and consumer prices themselves rather than the distortion
wedges as the policy instruments.  Since world prices are assumed fixed, these alternative
procedures are of course equivalent.
The specification  of the economy's behavioral  equations  uses standard dual techniques.' On
the supply side, we assume until Section IV that production is carried out efficiently under
competitive  conditions.  It may therefore be characterised  by a GNP function, g(p,v), which
gives the maximum  value of output that can be produced  facing prices p, given the economy's
factor endowments  (denoted  by the vector  v) and technology.  By Hotelling's  Lemma, the price
derivatives of  this  function, gp(p,v), give the  economy's general equilibrium net  supply
functions, y(p,v).  On  the demand side, we abstract fronm.  distribution to  concentrate on
7 In Anderson  and Neary (1992b),  we discuss  how endogenous  world prices can be incorporated.
See Dixirand.Norman (1980) for an overview.
.4efficiency issues and assume that the ecnnomy can be represer.ted by  a  single aggregate
household. The behavior of this household  is characterised  by an expenditure  function, e(q,u),
which gives the minimum expenditure  needed to attain utility level u facing prices q.  By
Stiephard's Lemma, the price derivatives of  this function, eq(q,u), give the (compensated)
consumer  demand functions,  x(q,u).
The existence  of domestic  policy distortions  generates net government  rev'.nue, which may
be positive or negative, equal to (q-p*)'x-(p-p*)'y. 9 Following standardi  conventdon,  we
assume that this is redistributed  to (or, if negative, collected from) the private sector in a 1: rmp-
sum fashion.  The specification  of equilibrium  can now be completed by introducing a new
function, the Balance of Trade Function, defined as the excess of consumer expenditure  over
inci3me  (the latter in turn equal to the sum of GNP and net government  revenue):
(2.1)  B(p,q,u)  - e(q,u) - g(p,v) - (q-p*)'x(q,u)  +  (p-p*)'v(p,v).
Note that the Balance of Trade Function is defined over the policy variables p and q; and that
it is conditional  on world prices p* as well as on all the other exogenous variables  underlying
the general equilibrium  of the economy.  Ignoring  any exogenous  international  transfers, a full
equilibrium  of the economy can be characterised  by the requirement that B(p,q,u) is zero.
While our main interest is in developing  a measure of the tariff equivalent of an arbitrary
set of distortions. it is helpful to digress and derive first the relationship  between changes in
distortions  and changes in welfare.  This is easily done by setting (2.1) equal !o zero and totally
differentiating,  to obtain:
(2.2)  Budu  =  - Bp'dp - Bq'dq,
where:
(2.3)  Bu  [l-(q-p*)'xde.,
(2.4)  -Bp'  -(p-p*)'yp,
(2.5)  -Bq'  (q-p*)'xq.
9  All vectors are column vectors and a prime (') denotes a transpose.
5The interpretation  of (2.2) is relatively straightforward  and familiar.  The left-hand side gives
the change in utility multiplied  by a parameter B, which may reasonably be assumed to be
positive."'  Utility therefore rises whenever  the rigi..-hand  side is positive.  To interpret this,
recall that the matrix of price derivatives of supply, yp, is positive semi-definite  (since g is
convex in p) and that the matrix of compensated  price derivat'ves of demrnid,  x;,  is negative
semi-definite  (since e is concave in q).  It follows that if there is only a single distortion in
either production  or consumption,  welfare will rise if its magaitude  is progressively  reduced;  an'
if there are  many distortions, welfare will rise if they are  reduced in an equiproportionate
manner (i.e., if  dp = (p-p*)da  or  dq =  (q-p*)dp,  where da and d,  are negative scalars).
More generally, any reduction of distortions is likely to raise welfare but,  especially if it
diverges significantly  from proportionality,  it need not do so."
WVe  are now ready to define the Trade Restrictiveness  Index (TRI).  Consider the
discrete comparison between two equilibria, indexed by  "0" and "1".  Since international
payments balance in both periods:
(2.6)  B(p 0,qO,u 0)  =  B(p 1,q',u1)  - O.
The TRI is now defined as the scalar factor of proportionality, or tariff factor surcharge,' 2 by
10 This term equals the marginal cost of utility multiplied  by a  "distortion multiplier" type of
expression.  If the term were not positive, the economy would be so distorted that a negative
transfer would raise welfare, in which case the policy reform problem is trivial. Alternative
sufficient conditions for the term to be positive are that equilibrium  be stable under a utility-
adjustment  mechanism  or that all goods be normal (the latter follows  from the condition  that q'xl
equals l-pAl,  where po is the price of and xol  is the income derivative of demand for the
numeraire).
" Versions of the "concertina  rule," first put forward by Bertrand  and Vanek (197  1), n.ay also
be developed  for this model, to show that a reduction in the highest  production or consumption
distortion must raise welfare, provided the good in question is a net substitute for all other
goods.
12  We use the term "tariff factor" to refer to one plus the tariff rate; and we use the term "tariff
factor surcharge' to refer to a tax on imports which multiplies the domestic  prices of tariff-
constrained goods by the tariff surcharge rate.  This is not the same as raising tarifs  by a
uniform proportionate rate, except when the starting point is free trade.
6which period-i prices would have to be adjusted to ensure balanced trade when utility is at its
period-O  level.  Formally, denoting  the TRJ by A:
(2.7)  &(pl,ql,u)  - [A: B(p 1/A,q'/A,u 0) = 0].
To interpret this Index, we begin by considering  two special  cases.  The first of these is where
pI  =q' and p`=q°; in this case, tariffs are the only form of distortion  and the Index measures  the
uniform tariff factor surcharge which is welfaie-equivalent  to the initial tariff structure: i.e., to
compensate  for a change  ,n  tariff  policy from (p°-p*) to (p'-p*),  it would  be necessary  to alter
domestic  prices by imposing  a uniform tariff factor surcharge  equal to the inverse of A." 3 The
second special case is where pl =ql= p*; in this case, the new equilibrium  is undistorted (both
producers and corsumers face world prices) and to compensate  for the move to free trade it
would be necessary  to imnose a uniform  tariff which raised prices by the inverse of A.  Figure
1 illustrates this second case for a  sin3le good where p0 >  p*  >  qe, implying that both
producers and consumers  are subsidised  in the initial equilibrium.  The resulting welfare loss
equals the sum of the producer surplus triangle ABC and the consumer surplus triangle DEF.
By construction,  the tariff factor 1/A is welfare-equivalent  to the policy vector (p0,q°) since it
gives rise to an identical welfare loss, equal to the sum of the producer and consumer surplus
triangles AGH and DIJ.'
Turning to  the general case,  in  which the new equilibrium need not  be undistorted
(p1￿q'  p*),  the Index measures (one plus) the uniform tariff surcharge which is welfare-
equivalent to the initial equilibrium.  For a give.n  initial equilibrium (p°,q°),  A is greater the
further the new equilibrium  is from the undistorted  equilibrium  (in which  pl=ql=p*).  Thus,
13 In this special case, the index is identical to the version tcnsidered in our earlier paper,
Anderson  and Neary (1992b).
14 Note that the tariff factor 1/A gives rise to an import volume GI which is lower than that in
the free trade equilibrium, AD.  By contrast, the. same ranking need not hold for the import
volume  in the initial equilibrium,  which  equals BD plus EF.  Of course, in general equilibrium,
changes in the import volume ii  one market are  balanced by opposing changes in  import
volumes in all other markets, so overall trade balance is maintained.
7for given (p°,q), a rise in A corresponds  to an increase in the trade restrictiveness  of domestic
taxes and subsidies."
The level of the TRI is conceptually  important.  However, in many applications  it is orly
practicable to estimate changes in the Index, so we must turn to interpret them.  Totally
differentiating  (2.7) for a given reference level of utility, u°, gives the effect on the Index of
changes in the period-i distortions:
(2.8)  A(BRdp+B;dq)  - (B,'p+Bq)dA =  0.
Cor--rting  to proportional  changes (writing A for dA/A, etc.), this becomes:
E(Bjp,)p,  + E(Bj  Q4j
(2.9)  A  =  '-.
Bpp+Bqq
where Bi and Bj denote aB/qp, and  OaBI& 1 , respectively. From (2.2), the numerator  of (2.9)
equals (minus) the  welfare effect of  the distortion changes.  This  is normalised by  the
expression  in the denominator:  Bpp+B;q. To interpret this, note that the derivatives  of B with
Tespect  to the distorted  prices may be interpreted  as the "shadow  quantities"  associated  with the
distortions, and the denominator  is the sum of these shadow quantities times the appropriate
prices.  Hence, the denominator  may be interpreted  as the "shadow  value of distorted  activity."
Note, however, that it need not be positive:  this depends  on how close to proportionality  are the
distortions and on whether they drive home prices above or below world prices.  Thus, the
change in A need not have the same sign as the change in welfare: a movement towards a
tax/subsidy regime which is equivalent to a greater degree of trade restrictiveness may be
associated with either a rise or a fall in welfare.  Fina!iy, note that all the terms needed to
15  This is why, in defining the TRI in (2.7), we adopt the convention  of deflating  p and q  by
A rather than scaling them up by A, which superficially  might seem more attractive.
8calculate  A are estimable.  Our approach  therefore  provides  the basis  of an operational  method
of measuring  the restrictiveness  of producer  and consumer  distortions  which (because  of the
appropriate  normalisation)  permits  consistent  comparisons  across  countries  and across  time.
9Hi  Ad Hoc versus True Producer and Consqmer Subsidy Equivalents
Inspecting equations  (2.7) and (2.9) in the previous section, it is clear that the TRI (in both
level and rate of  change form) has two distinct components, corresponding to changes in
producer and consumer taxes and subsidies respectively.  In this section we spell out this
decomposition,  which is of interest in itself and also allows a comparison  of our approach with
the commonly  used ad hoc measures  of producer and consumer subsidy  equivalents.
Returning to  (2.7), consider the outcome of defining a  distortion index separately for
production and  consumption distortions, rather than for both  together.  For  production
distortions, this leads to a true producer subsidy equivalent  index, 4", defined as:
(3.1)  W(pl,ql,u)  - [A":  B(pl/AP,q 1 ,u)  =  0].
Here, 4" gives the equiproportionate  change in production distortions alone which is welfare-
equivalent to the policy change from period 0 to period 1.  The rate of change of this index is
analogous  to that of the full index A and is calculated  in the same manner:
(B,p,)p,
(3.2)  AB  =  p  p
This may be compared with the change in the ad hoc producer subsidy  equivalent  index:
r,  (vj'dP 1
(3.3)  PSE  =  ',7
Comparing  (3.2) and (3.3), and recalling the definition  of the B, parameters in (2.4), it is clear
that the difference between the two indices hinges on the use of average production shares as
weights in (3.3) as opposed to marginal  production shares in (3.2).16
16 The numerator  of the average  weights  is just quantity  times  price, whe;zas that of the marginal
weights  equals, from (2.5), the sum of each distortion  times the rate of change  of each distorted
activity, times the price.  This switch from a linear to a quadratic structure is exploited by
Anderson  (1992) to show that the TRI can be decomposed  into two terms, one a function of the
average tariff and the other a function of the generalised  variance of tariffs.
10An identical  series of derivations  can be carried out for consumption  distortions.  Firstly,
we can define a true consumer subsidy equivalent index:
(3.4)  Al(pl,ql,u)  i  [AQ:  B(pl,ql/Al,uo = 0].
Once again, the proportionate change in this index is a weighted average of the distortion
changes, where the weights  are marginal consumption  shares:
E  (Bfl)4j
(3.5)  a9  =  X
Bqq
This should be compared to the change in the ad hoc consumer subsidy  equivalent:
E, (x, q)  q
(3.6)  CSE  =  xq
where average consumption  shares are inappropriately  used as weights.
Bringing  together these results, the change  in the full Trade Restrictiveness  Index can be
expressed as a weighted average of the changes in the true producer and consumer subsidy
equivalent  indices:" 7
(3.7)  A  =  XA'  + (I-X)?
where the weights  reflect the contributions  of production  and consumption  distortions  to the total
shadow  value of distorted activity:
(3.8)  X  *  Bpp
B,'p+B;q
This serves to place in perspective the advantages  of our approach over the commonly used
17This result is an approximation  only, since the changes in the three indices, A, AP  and A', are
evaluated at different points, as a comparison  of the arguments in equations (2.7), (3.1) and
(3.4) shows.
11alternative:  it uses appropriate weights  and it also correctly aggregates  the effects of changes in
the two types of distortions.
Finally,  our  approach permits an  alternative decomposition of  the  change  in  trade
restrictiveness:  by commodity  rather than by type of instrument.  For some purposes it may be
of interest to establish which commodities  have contributed most to the overall change in trade
restrictiveness.  By analogy with (3.7), an appropriate method of doing this is to decompose
the change in A as follows:
(3.9)  A  =  E  ajij
where Aj is the change in the distortion  index for commodity  j, defined as:
(3;10)  Aj  =  + (I->) 
Here the Ai and ^  parameters are weights, giving respectively  the contribution  of distortions  in
the market for good j  to the total shadow value of distorted activity and the contribution  of
production distortions to the shadow  value of distorted  activity in good j:
(3.11)  ,  OBIapj)pj+(aWBfq)qj
Bkp+Bq
(3.12)  1j  (( 8B/8p)pJ
(3.12)(aBI8pj)pj( 8BI8q)qj
121V Distortions in Non-Traded Goods Markets
It is relatively straightforward to incorporate distortions in non-traded goods markets into
the framework  used so far.  Let c and h denote respectively  the producer and consumer prices
of non-traded goods.  Adding them to  the list of arguments of the expenditure and GNP
functions, the condition for equilibrium  in non-traded goods markets may be written as:
(4.1)  eh(q,h,u)  =  g.(p,c,v).
This may now be solved for the equilibrium  producer price vector, c, which depends on all the
exogenous variables including the  vector of  distortions in  the  non-traded goods  markets
themselves, h-c,  which we write as r:
(4.2)  c  =  c(r,q,p,u,v).
The derivatives  of this function  are easily derived from (4.1); for example, the effect of changes
in distortion levels r on the producer prices c equals:
(4.3)  c7  =  (g.-ew)-lebh.
Incorporating this endogenous  determination  of c (and hence, for given x, of h), the amended
Balance of Trade Function becomes, instead of (2.1):
(4.4)  B(p,q,7,u)  - e{q,h(.),u}  - g{p,c(.),v}  - (q-p*)'x{q,h(.),u}
+  (p-p*)'y{p,c(.),v}  - t'eq{q,h(.),u}.
Consumer demands x now depend on the producer prices of traded goods p indirectly through
their dependence on non-traded goods prices h; and similarly supplies depend indirectly on
consumer  prices q.
The Trade Restrictiveness  Index may now be extended to the case where some goods are
non-traded.  Equation (2.7) becomes:
(4.5)  A(p 1,q1,r1,u)  - [:  B(p/I,q 1/,T 1,u") = 01.
Note that the index is defined by deflating  p and q but not 7.  This reflects the fact that it is an
index of trade restrictiveness:  it equals the uniform scaling factor applied to tariffs alone which
would compensate for  the changes in  distortions in both  traded and  non-traded sectors.
13Differentiating  (2.7) to obtain the change in the index yields, instead of (2.9):
;  (BPA  +  (Bq)4J  B,rdT
(4.6)  A  =  __+  _
B,P+B;q  A(B'p+B;q)
The first term on the right-hand side, relating a  to distortion changes  in traded goods markets,
is identical to that in (2.9), except that the derivatives of B must now take account of induced
changes in the prices of non-traded  goods.  The second term, which incorporates  the effects of
distortion changes in non-traded good markets, is also estimable in principle, although a new
feature introduced is that the level  of A now appears in the denominator.  This raises some
additional  issues in empirical applications,  but they do not significantly  reduce the applicability
of the method.8
18This problem may be overcome  by multiplying  (4.6) by A and treating  it as a first-order linear
differential equation in A:
(4.7)  dA  =  aA  + b,
where a and b are the two right-hand side coefficients  of (4.6).  The solution for A is:
(4.8)  A(t)  =  [(t_l)  + a]e  -
In practical applications, where we must work with discrete data, we start with the difference
equation analogous to (4.7) and solve to obtain:
(4.9)  A(t)  =  [(l+a)A(t-1) + b] -
This may be applied to each interval of change (each with different values of a and b), along
with the normalisation  condition that A be equal to one in the initial period.
14V  Distortions in Factor Markets
So far, we have assumed  that the only forms of distortion  are in final goods markets and that
production is carried out efficiently  within apd between sectors.  However, a significant  number
of distortions occurs in factor markets rather than in goods markets and it is desirable to have
a  method of quantifying their trade equivalents also.  To do this we must go behind the
economy-wide production structure given by the GNP function and allow for inefficiencies
arising from differences in factor prices between sectors."
To illustrate how this may be done, suppose that the economy can be divided into two
sectors, labelled "1" and "2", such that factors are allocated efficiently  within but not between
the two sectors.  Each of these "sectors" may itself be made up of a  number of distinct
sub-sectors.  We assume that the only form of goods-market  distortfons  are tariffs (so that q
equals p) and that import-competing  goods are produced in sector 1 t  ;iy.  (These assumptions
are made solely to simplify  the exposition;  the Appendix  shows  how they may be relaxed.)  The
assumption that factors are allocated efficiently within sectors 1 and 2 allows us to specify
sectoral product functions  gI(p,v 1) and g2(v 2) for each.  The allocations of factors to sectors,
represented by  the vectors vl  and v2, are  not given but adjust endogenously to  meet the
full-employment  constraint:
(5.1)  v1 +  V2 =  v,
and the factor-price constraint.  A general way of specifying the latter, following  Jones and
Neary (1991), is to write the factor price vector in sector 1, denoted by wl, as a function of the
factor price vector in sector 2, denoted by w2, and of a vector of distortion  parameters, denoted
by a:
(5.2)  wI  =  f(w 2,.y).
This specification  encompasses  as special cases many important special forms of factor-market
19  A substantial  literature developed  in the 1970s  dealing with factor-market  distortions, although
it paid relatively little attention to  their implications for international trade itself; see for
example, Jones (1971), Magee (1973)  and Neary (1978).  Our approach  here is closest to Dixit
and Norman (1980), Section 6.3, and to Jones and Neary (1991).
15distortion.  To see this, differentiate  (5.2) totally:
(5.3)  dw'  =  f,,dw 2 +  fdy.
Different types of factor-market  distortion may now be expressed in terms of restrictions  o0 the
elements of the two square matrices, fw  and  *.  For example, absolute differentials  imply that
fw  and f, both equal the identity matrix, I; proportional  differentials  (w 1 = rw2 where r is the
diagonal matrix formed from the vector y) imply that f, equals r and f. equals W, the diagonal
matrix formed from the vector w2; and sector-specific  factor-price  rigidities can be represented
by setting all the elements in the corresponding  rows of f4 equal to zero.  The production side
of the model is completed  by the assumption  that factors  are allocated  efficiently  within sectors,
i.e.,  that factor prices are equal to sectoral  value marginal products:
(5.4)  w'  =  g1v(p,v 1)  and  w 2 =  g2v(v 2).
The economy's total product is t1:en  the sum of outputs from the two sectors:
(5.5)  g(p,v,,y)  =  gI{p,vl(.)}  +  g2{v 2(.)},
where v1 and v2 are determined  endogenously  by (5.1), (5.2) and (5.4).  (The derivatives of
(5.5) are given itl the Appendix.)
The remaining  steps in deriving  the Trade Restrictiveness  Index in the presence  of factor-
market distortions are familiar.  The Balance  of Trade Function for this model becomes:
(5.6)  B(p,,y,u)  *  e(p,u) - g(p,v,y)  - (p-p*)'[Se(p,u)-g'p{p,v1(.)}].
We are now able to define the Trade Restrictiveness  Index for this model.  Just as in Section
II, it equals the proportional tariff surcharge factor which would compensate  for the changes in
both tariffs and factor-market  distortions between periods 0 and 1:
(5.7)  A(pl,'yl,u)  - [A : B(pl/A,'y 1,u)  =  0].
in proportional change form, this becomes:
16E (Bjp,)P,  Bad
(5.8)  A  (B~p  +)p
Bpp  ABpp
iiiis is similar to equation  (4.6) and, like it, in principle poses no new problems of estimation.
17VI  An Application:  The Tariff Equivalents  of Mexican  Agricultural  Policy
To illustrate  the application  of the Trade Restrictiveness  Index, we turn next to a case study
of an important  phase in the liberalization  of the Mexican  economy: the reforms of agricultural
policy in the late 1980's.  Drawing  on a more complete  study (Anderson  and Bannister, 1992),
we calculate the change in the Trade Restrictiveness  Index  for ten crops over the five years 1985
to 1989, taking account also of subsidies  to fertilizer use.
As in most countries, the pattern of government intervention in Mexican agriculture is
extremely complicated: most commodities  are subsidized  at both the consumer and producer
levels and also benefit from input subsidies,  especially to fertilizer use.  Additional  subsidies
apply in the market for the single most important  crop, maize (which accounts for over half of
Mexican  agricultural  production and about a quarter of its agricultural  imports).  In particular,
whole maize (which is a traded good) is the principal input into milled maize, which  is a
non-traded good and benefits from a subsidy.  Table 1 shows the extent of the changes, over
the period we consider, in the rates of subsidy to maize and to fertilizer use. The pattern of
policy change revealed is a complicated one, with no clear inferences possible without the
construction  of some  overall index number  of policy  restrictiveness. The standard  producer and
consumer subsidy equivalent indices can be constructed for this model and the picture they
reveal is discussed  below.  However, their theoretical  shortcomings  have already been outlined
in Section III.  So it is desirable to apply the new measure we have introduced  above.
For the particular application  considered  here, the version of the equation  defining changes
in A which we need to estimate is:
(Bp1)P  + E  (B,q)4  + B,df  +  (l/A)B7dr
(6.1)  Bp'p  +B;q+Bff
where p and q denote producer and consumer  prices of traded goods as before, f denotes the
domestic  price of the traded  input, fertilizer, and r denotes  the subsidy  to mrilled  maize use. To
operationalize  this equation, we require estimates of the supply and demand responses which
underlie the derivatives ef the balance of trade function, as given in equations (2.4) and (2.5).
Ideally, these should  come from a computable  general equilibrium  model  but, as is typically  the
18case in applied work, such a model, with a commodity  disaggregation  compatible  with the set
of policy instruments in which  .ie are interested, has not been estimated for the Mexican
agricultural  sector.  We must therefore  have recourse to partial equilibrium  estimates.  For the
present study, we assume that all cross-price  elasticities  are zero and take estimates  of own-price
elasticities  of output supply and input demand from a study by Nathan and Associates  (1990).
The results of using these elasticity  estimates  in equation (6.1) are given in the first row of
Table 2.20  The pattern of  changes in  trade restrictiveness revealed by  the overall TRI is
clearcut.  The TRI shows a large increase in restrictiveness  in  1986 and especially in  1987,
followed by major reductions in restrictiveness  in 1988 and 1989.  The cumulative effect of
these changes is a 40.9% fall in trade restrictiveness  over the four-year period.
As we noted at the end of Section  IN, it is possible  to decompose  the overall change in the
TRI in order to pinpoint the sources  of change.  Firstly, we consider the decomposition  by type
of agricultural  commodity. The next eleven  rows of the Table show  that the dominant  influence
on the overall index has been  policy towards maize.  However, it has not always been decisive:
in 1986,  for example, a significant  tightening  of policy in the sorghum  market dominates  a mild
liberalization  in maize policy to yield an overall rise in restrictiveness.
The next three rows in Table 2 present an alternative  decomposition  of the overall change
in the TRI: this time, by type of instrument rather than by commodity group.  Referring to
equation  (3.7), the first of these rows gives the calculated  values of  XA"  , and analogously  for
the remaining two rows.  This reveals that by far the bulk of the change in the index is
accounted for by changes in production subsidies.  Changes in  consumption and fertiliser
subsidies,  by contrast, account for extremely small changes in the overall stance of policy.
Finally, it is of interest to compare the pattern of policy change revealed by the TRI with
that suggested  by the ad hoc producer and consumer subsidy  equivalent  indices.  This is done
in the final four rows of Table 2.  The decomposition  of changes in overall restrictiveness
revealed  by the "true" indices, Al and Al, is similar to that revealed by the earlier decomposition
20 Anderson  and Bannister  (1992)  show  that the results  are not unduly sensitive  to changes  in the
elasticity estimates  used.
19by policy instrument.  By contrast, the pattern of changes in the ad hoc PSE and CSE indices
is completely  different.  Comparing  first the PSE with ,P, the movements  in the two are in the
sanre direction in only three of the four years and in those three years the magnitude  of the
change in AP  ranges from five to fourteen times that in the PSE.  While the cumulative  changes
in the two indices are comparable, it is clear that the PSE is a totally inadequate guide to
changes in the true index AP. Similar discrepancies  between  changes  in the CSE and in the true
consumer subsidy index Al show that here too the ad hoc measure cannot be relied upon to
provide an accurate reflection of the change in the restrictiveness  of consumer price policies.
Recalling that there is no consistent method of aggregating the PSE and CSE suggests that,
despite the limitations  of the TRI enforced by the need to  -se crude elasticitv estimates, there
is no alternative to using it if we seek an index of the overall impact on trade of policy in
domastic markets.
20VII  Conclusions and Suggestions for j'urther  Research
In  this paper,  we have proposed a  new approach to  evaluating the  implications for
international  trade of domestic  tax and subsidy  policies.  The measure meets a clear need, since
the importance  of domestic policies is increasing!.'  recognised in trade negotiations  and since
consistent measures of the degree to which different countries have adopted trade-favoring
policies are needed to test many of the hypotheses  of the new literature on trade and growth.
Moreover, the measures  which have been used hitherto for these purposes have been shown to
lack any theoretical foundation  and to be unamenable  to consistent  aggregation.  By contrast,
the measure we have proposed in  this paper has a  secure foundation in  standard welfare
economics  and permits  consistent  aggregation  over different  policy instruments  and over different
commodity  groups.
Turning to applications, we have shown hew our approach can be applied by considering
a case study of changes in the trade restrictivene,  ; of Mexican  agricultural  policy from 1985  to
1989. The pattern of change during four years of important  policy changes which our results
reveal is of considerable  interest in itself.  More generally, the application  presented in Section
VI (and considered  in much more detail by Anderson  and Bannister  (1992)), shows  that the TRI
incorporating  changes in domestic  policies  can be successfully  estimated using only the sort of
existing parameter estimates (mainly own-price elasticities) which are  available for  many
markets.
There are clearly many directions in which it would be desirable to extend the analysis of
this paper.  At the empirical level, it would be desirable to investigate the robustness of the
estimates of trade restrictiveness to more satisfactory and comprehensive sets of parameter
estimates.  It would also be desirable  to incorporate  explicitly  the effects of distortions  in factor
markets along the lines indicated  in Section V.  Finally, consistent estimates of the TRI for
different countries should be calculated to illustrate the pattern of international  differences in
trade liberalization  and to explore the effects of such liberalization  on economic performance.
As for the theoretical level, much remains to be done to extend the conceptual framework to
incorporate distributional and  intertemporal considerations, and to  allow for more general
specifications  of the production  sector.  We believe  that this research agenda  promises to extend
21considerably our  knowledge and  understanding of  the  processes  and  effects  of  trade
liberalization.
22Appendix: Effects of Factor-Market Distortions
In this Appendix,  we provide further  details on the behavior  of the economy  in the presence
of factor-market distortions.  Sections A.  1 and A.2  show how to  calculate the price and
distortion  derivatives  of the GNP function and the output supply functions  respectively. TI- se
are a necessary  step in calculating  the derivatives  of the Balance  of Trade function (5.6), w lich
are needed in order to evaluate the expression  for  i  in (5.8).  Section A  -3 then show.,  how
the approach  to modelling  factor-market  distortions  adopted in Section V can be genieralised  to
allow for any number of sectors, all of which may produce the import-oi  ipeting goods.
A.1 Derivatives of the GNP Function:  g(p,v,Y)
The GNP function was defined in (5.5).  Totally differentiatir ; this, making use of (5.1)
and (5.4), gives:
(A.  1)  dg  =  g1p.dp  +  (wl-w2)'dvl.
To eliminate the changes in factor allocations from thi'1,  differentiate  (5.4) and combine with
(5.3) to obtain:
(A.2)  dv 1 =  (gl,v+fwg 2w)- 1 [-glv,dp  + f,d-J1.
Substituting  into (A. 1) and collecting  terms gives the expressions  we seek for the effects of price
and distortion changes  on GNP:
(A.3)  gp  =  g1p  - (wl-w 2)'(  - +wg2w)  1 jg 1,p,
(A.4)  g.  =  (w'-w2 )'(g1 w+fwj 2 1 )-f 7 .
In both these equations,  a key X  .atrix is (gl,+fwg 2 ,V)- 1, which gives the effects of higher factor
prices in sector 1, wl, on eripioyment levels there, vl.  In the case of absolute factor-price
differentials, fw  collapse  tc  1he  %dentity  matrix and the key matrix is negative definite. But
nothing can be sad al ouw  its properties in general.  In equation (A.3), the first term on the
right-l  .axd side, g'p, is the vector of outputs of import-competing  goods, y'. In the presence of
23distortions, this i  liffers from the price derivative of GNP by the second term: if the matrix
(g%.,+f.g 2 1 w)-  is negative definite, this term tends to encourage a further increase in GNP
whenever a price increase tends to raise the returns in sector 1 of those factors which are paid
higher premria  there (i.e., whenever the vectors (w' -w2) and glp are positively correlated).
As for equation (A.4), its interpretation  is straightforward  when the distok  ions take the form of
absolute  price differentials,  implying  that a proportionate  reduction  in distortions  will raise GNP.
A.2 Derivatives  of the Output Supply Functions: y1(p,v,y) =  g P{pt(.)}
Differentiating  totally the equation for the output supply functions, making use of (A.2),
gives the required derivatives:
(A.5)  ylp  =  glpp - glpv(  +fg2w)-lIlvpg
where the second term takes account of the induced factor reallocation  between sectors; and:
(A.6)  y'.,  =  g'p(gw+ fwg2  )-  If.
Once again, these derivatives have a straightforward  interpretation  with absolute intersectoral
factor-price  differentials.  But, more generally, as is well-known  from the literature on factor-
market  distortions  in the two-sector  model, perverse price-output  and distortion-output  responses
are possible. 2"
A.3 The GNP Function  with Many  Sectors
The assumption  that factors are allocated  efficiently  within each sector allows us to specify
sectoral product functioiis for each:
(A.7)  g'(p',v')  *  Max [p'.x'  : F'(x',v)  = 01  i  = 1,  ... n,
X.
where FP(x',v')  = 0 is the production constraint for sector i, summarising  the technology  there
2'  As  in  Neary  (1978),  stability arguments can  be  invoked to  place restrctions  on  the
comparative statics responses, but their interpretation is more difficult with more than two
factors or sectors.
24which is assumed  to be convex.  As for the distortions  themselves,  a general way of specifying
them, following  Jones and Neary (1991), is to extend  equation (5.2) by writing the factor price
vector in sector i, denoted  by w', as a function  of a vector of "free" or undistorted  factor prices,
denoted by w, and of a vector of sector-specific  distortion parameters, denoted by ':
(A.8)  wi  =  f(w,yi)  i  =  1, ...  n.
The free factor prices w will typically  be associated  with the actual factor prices in at least one
sector of the economy; nevertheless  the symmetric  specification  is more convenient.
The production side of the general model  is completed  by adding the marginal productivity
conditions:
(A.9)  wi  =  giv(p,vi)  i  =  1, ... n;
the full-employment  constraint:
(A.10)  E vi  =  v;
and the fact that GNP equals the sum of sectoral  products:
(A.11)  g(p,v,{j-)  =  E gi(p,v¶).
The 2n+1  vector equations (A.7), (A.9) and (A.10) can now be solved for the 2n+1  vector
unknowns, {wi}, {vi}  and w; and substituting  the results into (A.  11) allows us to proceed as in
the text.
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281985  1986  1987  1983  1989
Producer Subsidy  0.32  0.28  0.63  0.39  0.01
(p-P*)/P*
Consumer  Subsidy  0.31  0.40  0.08  0.20  0.35
l(P*-q)/p*
Nontraded  Good Subsidy  0.71  0.39  0.24  0.27  0.27
(c-h)/c
Fertilizer Input Subsidy  0.69  0.68  0.64  0.59  0.55
( f *  4  )/  f  ._  _._  _  ._  ,  _  _  _  __._  _  _  _  .
Table 1:  Primary Distortions in Maize  and Fertilizer
291986  1987  1988  1989  Cumulative
____________________________  1985-89
JT1RI:  7.5  40.2  -40.3  -34.3  -40.9
Decomposition  by
Commodity:
Maize  -3.9  38.8  -23.4  -29.3
Sotghum  17.5  -7.9  0.7  -3.3
Wheat  -1.3  0.4  1.0  -3.6
Soy Bean  -2.0  5.1  -6.2  4.4
Dry Bean  -2.9  -0.1  0.3  -0.3
Barley  0.2  -0.3  0.3  -0.2
- - Cottonseed  0.3  5.4  -11.1  -0.8
Sesame Seed  0.0  0.3  -0.1  0.4
Sunflower Seed  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Coffee  0.1  0.0  0.4  -0.1
Ferilizer  -0.5  -1.5  -2.0  -1.4
Decomposition  by Policy
Instrument:
Production  Subsidy  7.1  43.4  -41.4  -28.7
Consumption  Subsidy  0.9  -1.6  3.2  -4.2
Input (Ferilizer) Subsidy  -0.5  -1.5  -2.0  -1.4
Comparison  of True and Ad
Hoc Sub-Indices:
PSE  -7.4  2.4  -4.9  -5.9  -15.1
AiP  7.1  34.4  -31.6  -30.1  -31.2
CSE  -6.4  15.3  32.5  -31.0  -1.3
Aq  -79.8  -11.4  69.7  -7.9  -72.0
lahIe  2:  The TRU  and its Components  (% changes per annum)
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